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   The	  motivating	  question	  for	  this	  paper	  is	  whether	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  economic	  
interdependence	  between	  countries	  reduces	  the	  probability	  of	  war	  between	  them,	  with	  the	  
principal	  focus	  being	  on	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  which	  began	  a	  century	  ago.	  	  The	  issue	  achieves	  
salience	  because	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Great	  War	  (later	  renamed	  the	  First	  World	  War)	  followed	  
four	  decades	  of	  rapidly	  growing	  economic	  interaction	  among	  the	  countries	  of	  western	  Europe	  
and	  indeed	  between	  them	  and	  the	  far	  corners	  of	  the	  world.	  	  The	  period	  1870-­‐1913	  has	  
sometimes	  been	  called	  the	  first	  globalization,	  to	  be	  followed	  a	  hundred	  years	  later	  by	  a	  second	  
great	  period	  of	  globalization.	  	  Actually,	  the	  first	  globalization	  was	  in	  the	  16th	  century,	  which	  
involved	  the	  life-­‐transforming	  transmission	  of	  plants	  and	  diseases	  around	  the	  world.	  
	   The	  fact	  that	  the	  First	  World	  War	  broke	  out	  in	  1914	  is	  frequently	  adduced	  as	  evidence	  
that	  high	  economic	  interdependence	  does	  not	  ensure	  that	  war	  will	  not	  take	  place	  between	  the	  
relevant	  countries	  –	  and	  so	  it	  was.	  	  Often	  cited	  in	  this	  connection	  is	  Norman	  Angell	  (1910),	  to	  
the	  effect	  that	  the	  high	  economic	  interdependence	  and	  resulting	  common	  economic	  interests	  
should	  make	  war	  inconceivable.	  	  Similar	  arguments	  are	  made	  today	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  modern	  
world,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China.	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   This	  paper	  will	  first	  document	  the	  growth	  in	  economic	  interdependence	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  
century	  and	  again	  in	  the	  late	  20th	  century.	  It	  will	  report	  the	  main	  message	  Angell	  meant	  to	  
convey	  to	  his	  readers,	  which	  has	  since	  been	  much	  misinterpreted.	  	  It	  will	  then	  offer	  an	  analysis	  
of	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  I	  consistent	  with	  what	  Angell	  actually	  said.	  It	  puts	  much	  more	  
weight	  on	  the	  role	  of	  Russia,	  which	  plausibly	  thought	  it	  could	  gain	  economically	  from	  a	  
European	  war.	  	  Finally,	  it	  offers	  a	  few	  concluding	  remarks	  on	  the	  present	  situation,	  with	  special	  
attention	  to	  China,	  a	  rising	  power,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  dominant	  power.	  
Growth	  of	  Economic	  Interdependence	  
	   Technological	  developments	  followed	  by	  capital	  investment	  greatly	  reduced	  both	  the	  
cost	  and	  the	  uncertainties	  associated	  with	  long-­‐distance	  communication	  and	  transportation	  in	  
the	  late	  19th	  century,	  most	  notably	  the	  telegraph	  and	  the	  use	  of	  steam	  power	  for	  locomotion	  
both	  on	  land	  and	  at	  sea.	  	  The	  modern	  era	  can	  plausibly	  be	  dated	  from	  the	  1860s,	  which	  saw	  the	  
laying	  of	  the	  first	  successful	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  cable	  (1866),	  which	  meant	  for	  the	  first	  time	  a	  
message	  could	  travel	  much	  faster	  than	  a	  person	  (and	  the	  diseases	  the	  messenger	  might	  carry).	  	  
London	  had	  been	  linked	  to	  Paris	  in	  this	  way	  15	  years	  earlier.	  	  The	  trans-­‐continental	  railway	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  were	  both	  opened	  three	  years	  later,	  greatly	  easing	  
transportation	  between	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  and	  between	  Asia	  and	  the	  populated	  east	  coast	  of	  the	  
United	  States.	  	  The	  steamship	  greatly	  reduced	  travel	  times	  and	  their	  variability	  compared	  with	  
sailing	  vessels,	  such	  that	  the	  travel	  time	  from	  Britain	  to	  New	  York	  was	  reduced	  from	  five	  to	  
seven	  weeks	  in	  the	  1830s	  to	  a	  reliable	  two	  weeks	  in	  the	  1870s.	  	  These	  developments,	  and	  the	  
soon	  thereafter	  invention	  of	  refrigeration,	  resulted	  in	  a	  veritable	  explosion	  of	  trade	  and	  in	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movements	  of	  financial	  capital,	  along	  with	  people	  and	  ideas.	  Also,	  many	  European	  countries,	  
led	  by	  Britain,	  reduced	  their	  duties	  on	  imports.	  
	   Table	  1	  presents	  the	  ratio	  of	  merchandise	  exports	  to	  estimated	  gross	  domestic	  product	  
(a	  measure	  of	  the	  total	  economic	  output	  of	  a	  country	  for	  a	  given	  year)	  for	  1870,	  1913,	  1973,	  
and	  1998	  for	  nine	  leading	  countries	  and	  for	  the	  world.	  	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  there	  that	  trade	  was	  
more	  important	  for	  Britain,	  which	  was	  the	  world’s	  leading	  trading	  nation,	  than	  for	  other	  
countries	  already	  in	  1870.	  	  But	  this	  importance	  grew	  by	  nearly	  fifty	  percent	  by	  1913,	  to	  over	  17	  
percent,	  and	  by	  proportionately	  even	  more	  for	  the	  other	  listed	  countries.	  	  Germany	  also	  
showed	  a	  relatively	  heavy	  dependence	  on	  exports	  (as	  did	  most	  smaller	  European	  countries	  such	  
as	  Belgium,	  the	  Netherlands,	  and	  Switzerland,	  not	  shown	  here).	  	  That	  dependence	  was	  notably	  
less	  for	  France,	  and	  still	  less	  for	  Russia	  and	  the	  USA,	  both	  of	  which	  sported	  high	  protective	  
tariffs	  against	  imports	  (	  84	  percent	  on	  manufactures	  in	  1913	  in	  Russia,	  compared	  with	  44	  
percent	  in	  the	  USA,	  20	  percent	  in	  France,	  and	  0	  percent	  in	  Britain)	  –	  which,	  according	  to	  well-­‐
established	  economic	  analysis,	  will	  over	  time	  also	  hurt	  exports	  (data	  from	  Bairoch,	  1989,	  
reported	  in	  Findlay	  and	  O’Rourke).	  
	   The	  period	  between	  1913	  and	  1973	  saw	  two	  world	  wars	  and	  the	  Great	  Depression	  of	  
the	  1930s,	  all	  of	  which	  discouraged	  trade	  –	  partly	  through	  disruption	  and	  lower	  incomes,	  partly	  
through	  the	  sharp	  increase	  in	  trade-­‐restrictive	  policies,	  which	  however	  began	  to	  be	  eased	  
gradually	  starting	  in	  the	  late	  1940s.	  The	  importance	  of	  exports	  to	  Britain	  actually	  fell	  between	  
1913	  and	  1973,	  as	  it	  did	  for	  China,	  India,	  and	  Spain,	  all	  of	  which	  had	  introduced	  strong	  trade-­‐
restricting	  policies.	  	  But	  for	  the	  other	  listed	  countries,	  exports	  were	  more	  important	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economically	  even	  than	  they	  had	  been	  in	  1913.	  	  And	  this	  relative	  importance	  greatly	  increased	  
(except	  for	  India)	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century,	  during	  the	  recent	  period	  of	  globalization.	  
	   Table	  2	  offers	  a	  different	  measure	  of	  interdependence:	  the	  importance	  (again	  relative	  to	  
GDP)	  of	  ownership	  of	  assets	  abroad	  for	  five	  leading	  capital-­‐exporting	  countries	  in	  1914	  and	  in	  
2005	  (these	  are	  gross	  assets,	  not	  netted	  against	  liabilities	  to	  foreigners,	  which	  also	  grew	  
substantially,	  since	  much	  British	  investment,	  for	  example,	  was	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  
other	  way	  around).	  	  	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  by	  1914	  the	  foreign	  assets	  of	  Britain	  –	  far	  the	  largest	  
investor	  abroad	  –	  were	  already	  approaching	  GDP	  in	  magnitude.	  	  It	  was	  also	  significant	  for	  
France,	  although	  much	  lower	  than	  for	  Britain,	  and	  still	  lower	  for	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  
States,	  the	  other	  largest	  economies.	  	  Much	  of	  this	  foreign	  investment	  was	  lost	  or	  sold	  during	  
the	  world	  wars.	  	  But	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  foreign	  investment	  resumed	  on	  an	  
even	  larger	  scale,	  and	  by	  2005	  reached	  more	  than	  twice	  GDP	  for	  Britain	  and	  nearly	  twice	  for	  
France;	  not	  far	  short	  of	  GDP	  for	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (which	  was	  the	  world’s	  largest	  
foreign	  investor	  in	  dollar	  value);	  and	  half	  GDP	  for	  Japan,	  in	  2005	  the	  world’s	  second	  largest	  
economy	  after	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  goods	  and	  financial	  capital,	  people	  began	  to	  move	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  in	  the	  
late	  19th	  century,	  facilitated	  by	  the	  greater	  ease	  and	  lower	  cost	  of	  long-­‐distance	  travel,	  mainly	  
from	  Europe	  to	  North	  and	  South	  America,	  but	  also	  within	  the	  British	  empire,	  especially	  from	  
India	  to	  many	  other	  British	  possessions,	  and	  from	  China.	  Gross	  annual	  emigration	  from	  Europe	  
rose	  from	  under	  300,000	  before	  1865	  to	  700,000	  in	  the	  1880s	  to	  over	  1.2	  million	  in	  the	  first	  
decade	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  (Chiswick	  and	  Hatton,	  p.69).	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And	  of	  course	  ideas	  –	  especially	  technology	  –	  were	  rapidly	  disseminated.	  	  The	  railroad	  
and	  steam	  locomotives	  were	  first	  developed	  in	  Britain,	  but	  the	  invention	  was	  so	  attractive	  that	  
it	  quickly	  spread	  to	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  often	  facilitated	  by	  British	  investments.	  	  British	  and	  
other	  European	  and	  increasingly	  American	  machinery	  involved	  not	  only	  trade	  in	  goods,	  but	  
introduced	  new	  techniques	  of	  production.	  	  So	  national	  economies	  were	  tied	  more	  closely	  
together	  through	  many	  channels.	  
Rehabilitating	  Norman	  Angell	  
	   It	  was	  against	  this	  background	  that	  Norman	  Angell	  wrote	  The	  Great	  Illusion	  (1910).	  	  He	  
was	  disturbed	  by	  the	  naval	  race	  that	  was	  taking	  place	  between	  Britain	  and	  Germany	  during	  the	  
first	  decade	  of	  the	  century,	  especially	  the	  construction	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  huge	  Dreadnought-­‐class	  
battleships.	  	  Not	  only	  was	  this	  vastly	  expensive	  in	  budgetary	  terms,	  but	  Angell	  could	  not	  see	  
how	  they	  could	  possibly	  be	  useful,	  since	  war	  or	  even	  the	  threat	  of	  war	  could	  not	  produce	  
greater	  prosperity.	  The	  book’s	  main	  message	  was	  not	  that	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  economic	  
interdependence	  between	  these	  two	  large	  economies	  would	  make	  war	  between	  them	  
inconceivable,	  but	  rather	  that	  it	  would	  make	  such	  a	  war	  stupid	  (my	  term,	  not	  Angell’s).	  	  
Concretely,	  even	  the	  “winner”	  in	  a	  war	  between	  them	  would	  end	  up	  being	  worse	  off	  after	  the	  
victory	  than	  before.	  	  This	  was,	  in	  Angell’s	  view,	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  with	  many	  previous	  wars,	  
where	  the	  winner	  could	  plausibly	  expect	  to	  gain	  from	  a	  victorious	  war,	  in	  booty	  or	  in	  territory.	  	  
Modern	  economies	  were	  built	  on	  money	  and	  credit,	  both	  requiring	  trust	  and	  benign	  conditions	  
that	  would	  be	  destroyed	  or	  badly	  damaged	  by	  war	  under	  modern	  conditions.	  	  In	  this	  of	  course	  
Angell	  was	  completely	  correct.	  	  Victorious	  Britain	  was	  worse	  off	  after	  the	  war,	  having	  inter	  alia	  
depleted	  its	  overseas	  investments	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  war,	  not	  to	  mention	  having	  lost	  or	  maimed	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thousands	  of	  young	  men,	  as	  was	  France.	  	  It	  is	  noteworthy,	  however,	  that	  although	  many	  of	  
Angell’s	  arguments	  were	  couched	  in	  general	  terms,	  he	  was	  specifically	  addressing	  Britain	  and	  
especially	  Germany	  (as	  Ferguson	  (1998)	  has	  well	  noted),	  not	  all	  countries	  or	  even	  all	  European	  
countries.	  
	  
Origin	  of	  the	  Great	  War	  
	   Why	  then	  did	  such	  a	  stupid	  war	  start?	  	  Here	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  recount	  in	  detail	  the	  
actual	  sequence	  of	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  German	  invasion	  of	  Belgium	  on	  August	  3,	  1914,	  or	  the	  
extensive	  imputation	  of	  motivations	  or	  the	  “domino”	  logic	  of	  the	  relationships	  among	  events.	  	  
They	  have	  been	  gone	  over	  many	  times,	  and	  interpretations	  still	  differ	  a	  century	  later	  (see,	  e.g.,	  
Clark,	  Cowley,	  Ferguson,	  Langer,	  McMeekin,	  Taylor,	  Turner).	  	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  useful	  briefly	  to	  
review	  the	  main	  events,	  since	  international	  tensions	  were	  occasionally	  high	  over	  previous	  
decades,	  even	  resulting	  in	  limited	  wars,	  but	  then	  seemed	  to	  recede,	  as	  the	  conflicts	  were	  
“managed”	  diplomatically.	  	  In	  general,	  compared	  with	  earlier	  periods	  in	  Europe,	  the	  19th	  
century	  was	  one	  of	  peace	  after	  the	  defeat	  of	  Napoleon	  in	  1815,	  managed	  by	  the	  “Concert	  of	  
Europe.”	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  were	  several	  wars	  involving	  the	  major	  powers:	  the	  Crimean	  War	  of	  
1853-­‐54,	  pitting	  Britain,	  France,	  and	  OttomanTurkey	  against	  Russia,	  the	  Austrian-­‐Prussian	  War	  
of	  1866,	  the	  Franco-­‐Prussian	  War	  of	  1870-­‐71,	  and	  the	  Russo-­‐Turkish	  War	  of	  1877-­‐78.	  	  But	  they	  
were	  all	  relatively	  brief,	  limited	  in	  their	  military	  engagements,	  and	  settled	  by	  negotiation.	  	  A	  
German-­‐Austrian	  alliance	  was	  formed	  for	  five	  years	  in	  1879,	  renewed	  regularly	  until	  1918,	  
which	  newly-­‐created	  Italy	  joined	  in	  1882,	  forming	  the	  Triple	  Alliance.	  	  In	  partial	  response,	  a	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Franco-­‐Russian	  alliance	  was	  formed	  in	  1894.	  	  Britain	  maintained	  its	  distance	  from	  such	  formal	  
alliances,	  although	  from	  time	  to	  time	  it	  was	  wooed	  by	  both	  groups.	  	  And	  joint	  British-­‐French	  
military	  planning	  started	  in	  1904,	  creating	  French	  expectations	  of	  British	  support	  under	  some	  
circumstances,	  without	  (as	  the	  British	  government	  reminded	  France	  from	  time	  to	  time)	  
representing	  a	  formal	  commitment.	  
	   Britain	  was	  the	  established	  dominant	  power	  by	  1900,	  although	  that	  position	  was	  never	  
definitively	  accepted	  by	  France,	  a	  resentful	  power	  still	  smarting	  from	  its	  defeat	  in	  1871	  and	  the	  
loss	  of	  Alsace-­‐Lorraine,	  and	  no	  doubt	  still	  remembering	  Napoleon’s	  defeat	  nearly	  a	  century	  
earlier.	  	  Germany	  was	  seen	  in	  Britain	  and	  France	  as	  a	  rising	  power	  posing	  some	  threat	  to	  each,	  
although	  in	  economic	  terms	  the	  United	  States,	  safely	  on	  the	  western	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  with	  a	  
tradition	  of	  self-­‐absorption,	  was	  by	  1990	  larger	  than	  any	  of	  the	  three	  western	  European	  
economies.	  	  But	  from	  a	  German	  and	  Austrian	  perspective	  (and	  also	  some	  French,	  viewing	  the	  
development	  more	  positively	  as	  a	  counter-­‐weight	  to	  Germany)	  Russia	  was	  the	  rising	  power,	  
seen	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  their	  interests	  in	  eastern	  and	  southeastern	  Europe	  and	  in	  the	  Near	  
East.	  	  Italy,	  Japan,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  were	  aspiring	  powers,	  joining	  the	  scramble	  for	  
overseas	  colonies	  late	  in	  the	  century.	  	  Spain	  and	  Portugal	  had	  passed	  their	  prime,	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire	  based	  in	  Istanbul	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  sick	  man	  of	  Europe	  and	  probably	  on	  its	  last	  legs,	  and	  
the	  Austrian-­‐Hungarian	  dual	  monarchy	  was	  also	  viewed	  as	  very	  fragile.	  
	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  there	  were	  far	  fewer	  centers	  of	  national	  policy-­‐making	  in	  1913	  
than	  now,	  roughly	  50	  as	  opposed	  to	  over	  200	  today.	  	  All	  of	  Africa	  except	  Ethiopia	  was	  under	  the	  
effective,	  usually	  determining,	  influence	  of	  one	  or	  another	  European	  country,	  as	  was	  Asia	  
except	  for	  Japan,	  China,	  Siam	  (Thailand),	  Persia,	  and	  Afghanistan	  –	  and	  even	  in	  those	  countries	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European	  influence,	  and	  rivalry,	  was	  strong.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  western	  hemisphere	  had	  separated	  
from	  European	  control,	  although	  British	  influence	  remained	  strong	  in	  some	  places.	  	  
Independent	  countries	  were	  concentrated	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  western	  hemisphere.	  
	   There	  were	  many	  tense	  incidents	  among	  European	  countries	  in	  the	  decades	  before	  
1914,	  of	  which	  a	  short	  and	  very	  incomplete	  list	  would	  include	  the	  British-­‐German	  naval	  race,	  
already	  alluded	  to,	  in	  which	  Britain	  demonstrated	  its	  willingness	  to	  spend	  whatever	  was	  
necessary	  to	  stay	  well	  ahead	  of	  Germany	  in	  warships;	  but	  also	  Fashoda	  (1898),	  the	  Boer	  War	  
(1901-­‐3),	  Morocco	  (1906	  and	  again	  in	  1911),	  the	  Austrian	  annexation	  of	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  
(1908)	  –	  which	  especially	  affronted	  Serbia	  –	  Tripoli	  (Libya,1911),	  and	  two	  Balkan	  wars	  (1912-­‐13)	  
involving	  Serbia,	  Bulgaria,	  Greece,	  Montenegro,	  and	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  Each	  was	  brief	  and	  
brought	  to	  an	  end	  by	  intercession	  of	  the	  great	  powers	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  threats	  and	  
negotiation.	  	  These	  experiences	  created	  a	  climate	  of	  expectation	  that	  the	  “powers”	  could	  
manage	  matters	  well	  enough	  to	  keep	  them	  from	  escalating	  out	  of	  control.	  But	  some	  of	  the	  
powers	  were	  not	  so	  sure.	  Germany	  passed	  an	  army	  law	  in	  July	  1913	  to	  raise	  the	  size	  of	  its	  
peacetime	  army	  by	  136,000	  to	  890,000	  men.	  	  France	  followed	  a	  month	  later	  with	  the	  
controversial	  Three	  Year	  Law,	  which	  would	  extend	  the	  term	  of	  conscripts	  and	  raise	  the	  French	  
army	  to	  700,000.	  	  And	  in	  October	  Russia	  adopted	  its	  Great	  Program,	  to	  raise	  its	  winter	  







	   On	  June	  28,	  1914,	  the	  Archduke	  Ferdinand,	  nephew	  of	  Hapsburg	  Emperor	  Franz	  Josef	  
and	  heir	  to	  his	  throne,	  was	  assassinated	  in	  Sarajevo	  by	  a	  Bosnian	  Serb,	  suspected	  (correctly	  as	  it	  
turned	  out,	  but	  without	  hard	  evidence	  at	  the	  time)	  of	  being	  encouraged	  and	  supported	  by	  
elements	  of	  the	  Serbian	  government.	  	  A	  strong	  debate	  started	  in	  Vienna	  about	  how	  to	  respond	  
to	  this	  affront	  and	  provocation.	  	  Vienna	  received	  the	  infamous	  “blank	  check”	  from	  Berlin	  to	  deal	  
with	  the	  affront	  as	  Vienna	  thought	  appropriate.	  	  Hungarian	  prime	  minister	  Tisza	  objected	  to	  the	  
threat	  of	  war,	  urged	  by	  others	  and	  especially	  by	  chief	  of	  army	  staff	  Conrad,	  but	  eventually	  
relented	  on	  condition	  that	  no	  Serbian	  territory	  be	  absorbed	  into	  Austria.	  	  	  
A	  summit	  meeting	  between	  France	  (president	  Poincare	  joined	  by	  newly	  installed	  prime	  
minister	  and	  foreign	  minister	  Viviani)	  and	  Russia	  (Tsar	  Nicholas	  and	  his	  senior	  officials)	  took	  
place	  on	  July	  20-­‐23,	  and	  Austria	  did	  not	  want	  to	  act	  until	  Poincare	  was	  on	  his	  way	  by	  warship	  
back	  to	  France,	  to	  avoid	  Franco-­‐Russian	  coordination	  of	  their	  responses.	  Germany	  had	  hoped	  
for	  quick	  and	  decisive	  action	  by	  Austria,	  whatever	  it	  chose	  to	  do,	  but	  the	  resulting	  48-­‐hour	  
ultimatum	  to	  Serbia	  with	  hard	  conditions	  was	  not	  made	  until	  July	  23,	  (with	  Poincare	  and	  Viviani	  
at	  sea)	  	  nearly	  four	  weeks	  after	  the	  assassination.	  Perhaps	  surprisingly,	  Serbia	  gave	  a	  generally	  
responsive	  albeit	  ambiguous	  reply,	  clearly	  rejecting	  only	  one	  of	  the	  conditions.	  	  But	  Austria	  
wanted	  to	  punish	  Serbia	  once	  and	  for	  all	  for	  its	  impudence	  and	  anti-­‐Austrian	  behavior	  over	  the	  
preceding	  five	  years,	  began	  to	  mobilize	  its	  forces	  immediately	  the	  reply	  was	  received,	  and	  
declared	  war	  on	  Serbia	  on	  July	  28.	  	  It	  soon	  thereafter	  bombarded	  Belgrade	  (which	  was	  within	  
reach	  from	  Hungarian	  territory)	  but	  was	  not	  prepared	  to	  invade	  until	  August	  12.	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   It	  was	  understood	  in	  Russia	  and	  elsewhere	  that	  Russian	  mobilization	  of	  its	  army	  would	  
be	  more	  time	  consuming	  than	  mobilization	  in	  Germany,	  Austria,	  or	  France.	  Russian	  officials	  in	  
succession	  ordered	  a	  pre-­‐mobilization,	  a	  partial	  mobilization,	  and	  a	  full	  mobilization,	  the	  latter	  
cancelled	  by	  the	  Tsar	  on	  July	  29	  and	  then	  re-­‐instated	  a	  day	  later.	  	  Austria	  on	  July	  31	  responded	  
with	  general	  mobilization,	  and	  Germany	  declared	  a	  “state	  of	  threatening	  danger	  of	  war,”	  
followed	  by	  a	  full	  mobilization	  on	  August	  1,	  on	  which	  day	  France	  also	  mobilized.	  	  Germany,	  
influenced	  by	  Chancellor	  Bethmann’s	  sense	  of	  legal	  rectitude,	  declared	  war	  on	  Russia.	  	  
Germany’s	  war	  plan	  (the	  Schlieffen	  Plan	  going	  back	  to	  1908)	  entailed	  first	  hitting	  France	  hard,	  
westward	  through	  Belgium	  away	  from	  the	  heavily	  fortified	  French-­‐German	  border,	  requiring	  it	  
to	  sue	  for	  peace	  early,	  thus	  permitting	  the	  German	  troops	  to	  be	  moved	  eastward	  to	  face	  the	  
slow-­‐response	  Russians.	  	  In	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  move,	  Germany	  invaded	  Luxembourg	  on	  August	  2,	  
and	  requested	  Belgium	  to	  allow	  its	  troops	  to	  pass	  through	  to	  the	  French	  border.	  	  When	  this	  was	  
(predictably)	  denied,	  Germany	  invaded	  Belgium	  on	  August	  3	  and	  declared	  war	  on	  France.	  	  This	  
invasion	  tipped	  the	  balance	  within	  the	  neutral-­‐leaning	  British	  cabinet	  toward	  declaring	  war	  on	  
Germany,	  since	  Britain	  had	  been	  a	  guarantor	  of	  Belgium’s	  integrity	  since	  its	  creation	  in	  1830,	  
and	  strategically	  Britain	  did	  not	  want	  Germany	  to	  dominate	  the	  Scheldt	  River	  or	  to	  be	  lodged	  on	  
the	  coast	  directly	  opposite	  Britain.	  	  Foreign	  minister	  Grey	  argued	  that	  without	  strong	  reaction	  
to	  this	  German	  provocation,	  Britain’s	  credibility	  (to	  use	  a	  contemporary	  term)	  would	  be	  
questioned	  around	  the	  world.	  Moltke	  had	  insisted	  on	  the	  invasion	  of	  France	  through	  Belgium	  
for	  technical	  military	  reasons,	  driven	  partly	  by	  strategy	  but	  even	  more	  at	  that	  time	  by	  the	  
details	  of	  logistical	  planning	  –	  “war	  by	  timetable,”	  as	  AJP	  Taylor	  later	  called	  it	  -­‐-­‐	  an	  action	  that	  in	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the	  words	  of	  McMeekin	  (2013,	  p.401)	  was	  “a	  political,	  diplomatic,	  strategic	  and	  moral	  blunder	  
of	  the	  first	  magnitude.”	  
	   Who	  then	  was	  responsible	  for	  starting	  the	  European-­‐wide	  war	  among	  the	  major	  
powers?	  	  Austria	  wanted	  war,	  but	  only	  with	  Serbia.	  	  Austria	  assumed	  that	  unambiguous	  
German	  backing	  would	  keep	  Russia	  at	  bay.	  	  France	  and	  especially	  Britain	  were	  not	  especially	  
concerned	  –	  the	  assassination	  and	  Austria’s	  reaction	  was	  just	  another	  event	  in	  the	  troublesome	  
Balkans,	  to	  be	  managed	  (as	  in	  the	  past)	  with	  skillful	  diplomacy.	  	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  in	  July	  1914	  
the	  British	  government	  was	  preoccupied	  once	  again	  with	  the	  question	  of	  Home	  Rule	  for	  Ireland;	  
and	  France	  was	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  sensational	  trial	  of	  Mme.	  Caillaux	  for	  killing	  an	  editor	  for	  
his	  attacks	  on	  her	  husband,	  leader	  of	  the	  Radical	  party	  and	  prospective	  prime	  minister	  but	  for	  
the	  trial.	  	  Caillaux	  called	  for	  a	  less	  aggressive	  foreign	  policy	  and	  President	  Poincare	  feared	  he	  
would	  reduce	  the	  size	  of	  the	  French	  army.	  
	   The	  Russians	  knew	  that	  their	  mobilization	  would	  provoke	  a	  German	  mobilization	  and	  
almost	  certainly	  lead	  to	  a	  major	  war.	  	  Poincare	  of	  France,	  Russia’s	  strong	  ally,	  was	  from	  Lorraine	  
and	  was	  conspicuously	  anti-­‐German.	  	  He	  probably	  did	  not	  seek	  war,	  and	  he	  certainly	  wanted	  to	  
avoid	  starting	  a	  war	  in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  would	  alienate	  Britain,	  whose	  support	  he	  sought	  and	  
expected	  under	  the	  right	  conditions.	  But	  he	  probably	  welcomed	  war	  if	  it	  was	  started	  elsewhere	  
and	  if	  he	  could	  count	  on	  Russian	  support,	  to	  rectify	  past	  wrongs	  and	  future	  threats	  by	  Germany.	  	  
Thus	  the	  knowledgeable	  decision	  for	  a	  European	  war	  was	  by	  Russia.	  	  We	  need	  to	  look	  more	  





	   Russia	  in	  1914	  was	  formally	  an	  absolute	  monarchy	  under	  a	  tsar,	  who	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  
century	  was	  Nicholas	  II,	  a	  weak	  personality	  but	  the	  ultimate	  decision-­‐maker	  on	  matters	  of	  
foreign	  policy	  and	  war	  and	  peace.	  	  Russia	  had	  greatly	  expanded	  eastward	  in	  the	  18th	  and	  19th	  
centuries,	  and	  still	  had	  territorial	  aspirations	  in	  China	  and	  in	  Korea	  (challenged	  by	  Japan)	  and	  in	  
Persia	  and	  Afghanistan	  (challenged	  by	  Britain).	  	  It	  also	  wanted	  more	  secure	  borders	  in	  Europe,	  
having	  its	  eye	  on	  the	  Carpathian	  Mountains,	  west	  of	  Austria’s	  East	  Galicia,	  having	  earlier	  
absorbed	  Finland	  and	  much	  of	  Poland.	  	  Above	  all,	  it	  sought	  control	  of	  access	  to	  the	  
Mediterranean	  and	  wider	  oceans	  from	  the	  Black	  Sea	  through	  the	  Bosporus	  and	  Dardanelles,	  
which	  in	  practice	  meant	  controlling	  Istanbul.	  	  There	  were	  spiritual	  and	  religious	  reasons	  for	  this	  
objective	  as	  well	  as	  economic	  and	  geo-­‐political	  ones.	  	  Russia	  saw	  itself	  as	  the	  “third	  Rome,”	  the	  
seat	  and	  protector	  of	  orthodox	  Christianity	  since	  the	  fall	  (in	  1453)	  of	  Constantinople	  and	  the	  
Byzantine	  Empire.	  	  Many	  orthodox	  Christians	  were	  under	  Ottoman	  rule,	  where	  they	  were	  
treated	  (it	  was	  argued)	  as	  second-­‐class	  citizens.	  
	   Russia	  had	  experienced	  major	  domestic	  disturbances,	  pressures	  for	  relief	  from	  absolute	  
rule,	  which	  led	  in	  1906	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  elected	  legislature	  (Duma),	  with	  some	  legislative	  
powers,	  but	  with	  the	  Tsar	  retaining	  ultimate	  authority.	  	  It	  had	  also	  suffered	  a	  crushing	  defeat,	  
both	  on	  land	  and	  at	  sea,	  by	  the	  Japanese	  in	  1904-­‐05,	  over	  which	  country	  would	  be	  dominant	  in	  
Manchuria	  and	  in	  Korea.	  Compared	  with	  the	  increasingly	  industrialized	  Western	  Europe	  and	  
North	  America,	  Russia	  was	  a	  relatively	  backward	  country.	  	  But	  Russian	  leaders	  wanted	  to	  catch	  
up,	  more	  for	  power	  and	  status	  than	  for	  prosperity	  for	  their	  people.	  	  And	  in	  the	  pre-­‐1914	  period	  
it	  was	  showing	  some	  success:	  Russia’s	  GDP	  grew	  at	  2.4	  percent	  a	  year	  in	  the	  period	  1870-­‐1913,	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slower	  than	  Germany	  but	  faster	  than	  Britain,	  and	  by	  an	  impressive	  six	  percent	  a	  year	  in	  1908-­‐
1913	  (Maddison,	  2001,	  p.262;	  McDonald,	  p.205).	  Industrialization	  was	  beginning	  to	  take	  hold,	  
largely	  with	  strong	  government	  initiative	  and	  support,	  including	  high	  import	  tariffs,	  even	  higher	  
than	  those	  in	  the	  United	  States	  at	  the	  time	  (see	  Crisp,	  Miller).	  	  But	  the	  economy	  was	  still	  largely	  
self-­‐contained	  and	  indeed	  localized.	  	  It	  was	  a	  large	  country	  with	  poor	  internal	  transportation.	  	  It	  
was	  exporting	  grain	  primarily	  through	  the	  Bosporus,	  and	  importing	  modern	  equipment	  from	  
western	  European	  countries	  there	  and	  through	  the	  Baltic	  to	  St.	  Petersburg.	  	  (An	  indicator	  of	  
internal	  transportation	  difficulties	  is	  that	  it	  was	  also	  importing	  grain	  from	  high-­‐cost	  Germany	  
into	  northwestern	  Russia.)	  	  By	  1913,	  Russian	  officials	  were	  feeling	  confident	  again,	  although	  
some	  were	  still	  greatly	  worried	  about	  further	  internal	  disturbances.	  
	   Russians	  saw	  the	  main	  obstacles	  to	  their	  territorial	  ambitions	  in	  the	  west	  as	  the	  Austrian	  
and	  Ottoman	  empires,	  and	  their	  most	  serious	  potential	  adversary	  as	  Germany,	  mainly	  because	  
of	  its	  alliance	  with	  Austria	  but	  also	  because	  of	  its	  strong	  commercial	  interests	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  
empire,	  as	  reflected	  for	  example	  in	  the	  prospective	  Berlin	  to	  Baghdad	  railway.	  It	  relied	  on	  its	  
alliance	  with	  France,	  strongly	  re-­‐affirmed	  in	  the	  July	  1914	  summit,	  to	  distract	  and	  pre-­‐occupy	  
the	  German	  army	  in	  the	  event	  of	  war,	  playing	  skillfully	  on	  the	  strong	  residual	  resentment	  at	  the	  
reparations	  and	  loss	  of	  Alsace	  and	  Lorraine	  in	  1871,	  still	  in	  living	  memory	  of	  French	  leaders.	  
	   Russians	  planned	  an	  amphibious	  invasion	  of	  European	  Turkey,	  near	  Istanbul,	  as	  well	  as	  
from	  the	  Caucasus	  into	  eastern	  Anatolia,	  along	  with	  the	  occupation	  of	  eastern	  Galicia,	  while	  the	  
French	  tied	  up	  the	  main	  German	  forces	  in	  the	  west	  (McMeekin,	  2011).	  	  The	  French	  in	  sharp	  
contrast	  wanted	  Russia	  to	  attack	  Germany	  in	  East	  Prussia	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  to	  draw	  significant	  
German	  forces	  away	  from	  the	  western	  front.	  	  France	  made	  large	  loans	  to	  Russia	  in	  1906	  on	  the	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condition	  Russia	  reach	  an	  armistice	  with	  Japan,	  permitting	  its	  troops	  to	  move	  west,	  and	  again	  in	  
1913	  on	  condition	  Russia	  improve	  its	  railway	  network,	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  mobilizing	  troops	  
and	  bringing	  them	  into	  action	  more	  quickly.	  	  Indeed,	  capital	  outflows	  from	  both	  France	  and	  
Germany	  (as	  reflected	  in	  Table	  2)	  during	  the	  pre-­‐1914	  period	  were	  often	  politically	  motivated,	  
encouraged,	  and	  approved	  (McDonald,	  McMeekin,	  2011).	  
	   Russian	  prospects	  in	  1914	  seemed	  formidable,	  at	  least	  to	  German	  and	  French	  leaders.	  It	  
had	  a	  large	  and	  growing	  population;	  it	  was	  industrializing	  successfully;	  and	  it	  had	  plans	  to	  raise	  
the	  size	  of	  its	  standing	  winter	  army	  (including	  conscripts)	  to	  2	  million	  by	  1917,	  an	  army	  that	  
would	  be	  better	  trained	  and	  equipped	  than	  that	  in	  1913	  and	  would	  surpass	  the	  German	  army	  in	  
size.	  Above	  all,	  as	  McDonald	  (2009)	  has	  emphasized,	  Russia	  had	  a	  much	  stronger	  fiscal	  position	  
than	  either	  France	  or	  Germany,	  thanks	  in	  part	  to	  profits	  from	  state	  monopolies	  such	  as	  the	  
railroad	  and	  production	  of	  vodka.	  	  	  From	  Germany’s	  perspective,	  Russia	  was	  the	  rising	  power.	  	  
And	  Poincare	  worried	  that	  in	  time	  Russia	  would	  become	  less	  dependent	  on	  France,	  both	  
strategically	  and	  financially.	  	  Thus	  time	  was	  not	  on	  their	  side.	  	  	  
	   Russia	  had	  a	  more	  immediate	  concern.	  Amphibious	  invasion	  of	  Turkey	  would	  require	  
naval	  predominance	  in	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  which	  Russia	  had	  in	  1913.	  	  But	  the	  Ottomans	  had	  ordered	  
four	  new	  Dreadnought-­‐class	  battleships	  abroad,	  two	  in	  Britain	  that	  were	  due	  to	  be	  delivered	  in	  
late	  1914	  or	  1915.	  	  Under	  the	  Straits	  Convention	  of	  1841,	  modified	  only	  slightly	  in	  the	  Berlin	  
Treaty	  of	  1878,	  no	  country,	  including	  Russia,	  could	  move	  warships	  through	  the	  Straits	  in	  
peacetime.	  	  Thus	  Russia	  had	  to	  build	  its	  own	  warships	  in	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  and	  battleships	  of	  this	  
quality	  would	  not	  be	  ready	  until	  1917.	  	  Delivery	  of	  these	  new	  warships	  would	  provide	  Turkish	  
naval	  dominance	  in	  the	  Black	  Sea	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  thus	  foiling	  any	  sea-­‐based	  attack.	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   Russia’s	  interest	  in	  a	  European	  war	  was	  thus	  very	  different	  from	  that	  of	  other	  countries.	  	  
If	  all	  went	  well,	  Russia	  could	  expect	  to	  gain,	  economically	  as	  well	  as	  in	  stature,	  territory,	  and	  
population,	  from	  a	  successful	  war.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  Table	  1,	  Russia’s	  economic	  engagement	  with	  
other	  countries	  was	  much	  lower	  than	  that	  of	  the	  western	  European	  countries.	  Controlling	  the	  
Straits	  would	  increase	  Russian	  influence	  in	  the	  eastern	  Mediterranean	  (and	  possibly	  threaten	  
the	  Suez	  Canal,	  Britain’s	  key	  route	  to	  India)	  and	  make	  foreign	  trade	  from	  southern	  Russia	  more	  
secure.	  	  (The	  Ottomans	  had	  closed	  the	  Straits	  to	  Russian	  commercial	  trade	  briefly	  during	  the	  
Balkan	  wars,	  but	  they	  were	  re-­‐opened	  again	  after	  international	  protest.)	  	  Russian	  incentives	  
were	  thus	  very	  different	  from	  those	  of	  Britain	  or	  Germany,	  about	  which	  Angell	  was	  writing.	  	  
(According	  to	  Lambert	  (2012),	  the	  much	  maligned	  Dardanelles	  campaign	  of	  1915	  was	  not	  only	  
to	  provide	  strategic	  diversion	  from	  the	  western	  front,	  as	  is	  usually	  said,	  but	  even	  more	  to	  
permit	  export	  of	  Russian	  grain,	  badly	  needed	  in	  Britain,	  and	  the	  transfer	  of	  British	  arms	  into	  
Russia.)	  
	   Unfortunately	  for	  Russia,	  all	  did	  not	  go	  well.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  First	  Lord	  of	  the	  Admiralty	  
Winston	  Churchill	  diverted	  the	  two	  Ottoman	  battleships	  into	  the	  British	  navy,	  thus	  preventing	  
their	  delivery	  to	  Istanbul.	  	  But	  early	  in	  the	  war	  two	  German	  warships,	  escaping	  British	  pursuit	  in	  
the	  Mediterranean,	  requested	  and	  were	  granted	  refuge	  in	  Ottoman	  waters.	  	  The	  larger	  of	  the	  
two,	  the	  Goeben,	  while	  not	  a	  Dreadnought,	  outclassed	  all	  the	  Russian	  warships	  in	  the	  Black	  Sea.	  	  
This	  of	  course	  compromised	  Ottoman	  neutrality	  in	  the	  war.	  	  So	  the	  Germans	  “sold”	  the	  two	  
ships	  to	  Turkey,	  along	  with	  their	  German	  crews	  and	  commanders,	  who	  were	  commissioned	  in	  
the	  Ottoman	  navy	  (with	  permission	  from	  Berlin).	  	  This	  unexpected	  development	  effectively	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made	  a	  Russian	  amphibious	  attack	  prohibitive.	  	  As	  Clausewitz	  or	  someone	  said,	  once	  a	  war	  
starts	  all	  pre-­‐war	  plans	  become	  obsolete.	  
	   Russia’s	  main	  military	  thrust	  was	  in	  East	  Galicia,	  where	  its	  armies	  initially	  gained	  the	  
upper	  hand	  (Austria	  had	  moved	  many	  troops	  south	  to	  invade	  Serbia,	  wrongly	  guessing	  that	  
Russia	  would	  not	  attack).	  	  But	  to	  support	  its	  French	  allies,	  Russia	  also	  invaded	  East	  Prussia	  with	  
two	  army	  corps.	  	  They	  outnumbered	  the	  defending	  Germans,	  but	  due	  to	  poor	  communication	  
and	  coordination	  between	  the	  Russian	  armies	  (and	  some	  antagonism	  between	  the	  two	  Russian	  
generals),	  the	  Germans	  defeated	  first	  one	  corps	  and	  then	  the	  other	  in	  the	  battle	  of	  Tannenberg	  
–	  another	  unexpected	  event,	  both	  by	  the	  Germans,	  who	  had	  been	  prepared	  to	  retreat	  to	  a	  
more	  defensible	  line,	  and	  by	  the	  Russians.	  
Personalities	  and	  Public	  Opinion	  
	   We	  tend	  in	  normal	  discourse	  to	  personify	  nations	  and	  governments.	  	  But	  people,	  not	  
countries,	  make	  decisions.	  Foreign	  and	  military	  policy	  in	  all	  the	  great	  powers	  in	  1913	  were	  
made	  by	  relatively	  few	  people,	  albeit	  influenced	  by	  press	  commentary	  in	  all	  countries,	  even	  in	  
Russia.	  	  And	  the	  press	  often	  reflected	  the	  views	  of	  organized	  pressure	  groups	  and	  of	  public	  
sentiment	  more	  generally.	  	  In	  Russia,	  Tsar	  Nicholas	  II	  was	  the	  ultimate	  decision-­‐maker	  on	  these	  
issues,	  but	  he	  was	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  foreign	  affairs	  minister	  Sazonov	  and	  minister	  of	  war	  
(and	  general)	  Sukhomlinov,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  other	  members	  of	  the	  cabinet.	  	  	  
In	  France,	  Raymond	  Poincare	  was	  the	  dominant	  figure,	  even	  though	  as	  president	  he	  had	  
few	  formal	  powers;	  Prime	  Minister	  Viviani	  was	  only	  a	  placeholder	  until	  the	  trial	  of	  Mme.	  
Caillaux	  concluded,	  and	  was	  inexperienced	  in	  foreign	  affairs.	  	  Joffre	  commanded	  the	  army.	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In	  Germany,	  the	  erratic	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  II,	  often	  belligerent	  in	  words	  but	  shrinking	  from	  
actual	  combat,	  was	  the	  highest	  authority,	  with	  Bethmann-­‐Holweg	  as	  Chancellor	  and	  Moltke	  as	  
chief	  of	  the	  general	  staff.	  	  In	  Austria,	  Franz	  Josef	  was	  emperor,	  advised	  by	  Berchtold	  on	  foreign	  
policy	  with	  Conrad	  as	  army	  chief	  of	  staff.	  	  Asquith	  was	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Britain	  with	  Grey	  as	  
influential	  foreign	  minister,	  but	  the	  Cabinet	  participated	  in	  most	  key	  decisions.	  	  	  
The	  top	  military	  figures	  in	  Russia,	  Austria,	  and	  Germany	  had	  direct	  access	  to	  their	  
emperors,	  without	  necessarily	  going	  through	  the	  civilian	  ministers.	  	  And	  in	  all	  three	  cases	  they	  
not	  only	  had	  responsibility	  of	  preparing	  for	  war,	  which	  was	  natural,	  but	  in	  each	  case	  they	  
advocated	  war:	  Conrad	  with	  respect	  to	  Serbia,	  Moltke	  with	  respect	  to	  Russia	  (necessarily	  
thereby	  taking	  on	  France),	  Sukhomlinov	  with	  respect	  to	  Austria	  and	  Istanbul.	  	  Prime	  ministers	  
and	  foreign	  ministers	  were	  generally	  more	  cautious,	  but	  were	  gradually	  brought	  around,	  
whether	  by	  external	  events	  or	  internal	  argument.	  
	   There	  were	  serious	  anti-­‐war	  voices	  in	  all	  countries,	  and	  in	  all	  governments.	  	  These	  voices	  
were	  eventually	  either	  sidelined,	  e.g.	  Kokovstev	  in	  Russia,	  or	  overwhelmed	  by	  events,	  e.g.	  by	  
the	  assassination	  the	  cautious	  Franz	  Ferdinand	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Berchtold,	  or	  by	  Germany’s	  attack	  
on	  Belgium	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Britain.	  
	   Press	  commentary	  in	  1913	  was	  widely	  divergent,	  from	  chauvinistic	  and	  even	  xenophobic	  
to	  cautionary	  and	  internationalist.	  	  Publics	  however	  were	  easily	  worked	  up	  by	  threats	  or	  actions	  
by	  potentially	  hostile	  foreigners,	  and	  once	  the	  war	  started	  the	  press	  and	  public	  opinion,	  with	  
rare	  exceptions,	  became	  nationalistic	  and	  hostile	  to	  the	  enemies.	  	  Partial	  exceptions	  were	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polyglot	  Austria	  and	  relatively	  uneducated	  Russia,	  where	  conscription	  was	  universal	  but	  
unpopular.	  
	   We	  now	  know	  how	  the	  war	  came	  out.	  	  It	  was	  much	  longer	  and	  much	  more	  costly	  in	  lives	  
and	  resources	  than	  anyone	  had	  imagined	  in	  1914.	  	  Four	  empires	  disappeared,	  and	  the	  two	  
leading	  European	  democracies	  were	  greatly	  weakened.	  	  Russia	  experienced	  a	  revolution	  (with	  
German	  help	  in	  conveying	  Lenin	  from	  Switzerland	  to	  Finland)	  that	  introduced	  a	  communist	  
dictatorship	  for	  the	  next	  seven	  decades.	  	  If	  leaders	  had	  forecast	  the	  actual	  costs,	  they	  
undoubtedly	  would	  have	  worked	  much	  harder	  to	  avoid	  war,	  even	  the	  generals.	  	  But	  each	  
government	  thought	  its	  approach	  not	  only	  had	  a	  chance	  of	  working	  in	  the	  country’s	  perceived	  
interests,	  but	  that	  it	  would	  work.	  	  Moltke	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  pessimistic,	  but	  he	  was	  also	  
pessimistic	  about	  the	  alternatives	  and	  on	  balance	  opted	  for	  preventive	  war.	  
Lessons?	  
	   It	  is	  doubtful	  that	  one	  can	  learn	  lessons	  from	  history.	  	  And	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  
history	  may	  be	  the	  wrong	  lessons,	  as	  when	  Germany	  in	  1914	  thought	  it	  could	  drive	  France	  
quickly	  to	  plead	  for	  an	  armistice,	  as	  it	  did	  in	  1871,	  or	  that	  winners	  of	  wars	  can	  gain	  in	  material	  
terms,	  as	  they	  often	  had	  in	  the	  past.	  	  	  
But	  history	  can	  stimulate	  the	  imagination.	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  possible,	  as	  Angell	  warned	  in	  
1910,	  and	  as	  actually	  occurred	  in	  1914-­‐18,	  that	  even	  the	  winner	  of	  a	  future	  war	  may	  end	  up	  
much	  worse	  off	  than	  it	  was	  before	  the	  war,	  and,	  more	  conjecturally,	  than	  it	  would	  have	  been	  
without	  the	  war.	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   Economic	  interdependence	  is	  much	  higher	  in	  2013	  than	  it	  was	  in	  1913	  for	  most	  
countries,	  including	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (see	  Tables	  1	  and	  2).	  War	  would	  be	  extremely	  
costly	  for	  both,	  beyond	  the	  direct	  budgetary	  costs.	  	  That	  it	  would	  be	  more	  costly	  to	  China	  than	  
to	  the	  USA,	  because	  of	  the	  likely	  international	  isolation	  of	  China	  and	  quicker	  recovery	  of	  the	  
United	  States,	  is	  small	  consolation.	  	  The	  governments	  of	  both	  countries	  recognize	  that.	  	  The	  
lesson	  of	  this	  paper,	  if	  there	  is	  one,	  is	  to	  beware	  of	  third	  countries.	  Do	  not	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  
leading	  protagonists	  alone.	  	  Every	  society	  has	  its	  collective	  hang-­‐ups	  and	  vulnerabilities;	  skillful	  
outside	  parties	  can	  exploit	  national	  sentiments	  to	  engender	  conflicts	  that	  are	  objectively	  
irrational	  in	  material	  terms.	  
	   Who	  might	  those	  third	  countries	  be	  in	  the	  contemporary	  context?	  	  North	  Korea,	  Taiwan,	  
and	  Iran	  come	  immediately	  to	  mind.	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  worthwhile	  to	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  others,	  e.g.	  
perhaps	  Japan	  and,	  yes,	  even	  Russia	  again,	  which	  might	  calculate	  that	  a	  serious	  conflict	  
between	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  would	  enhance	  its	  status	  in	  the	  world	  –	  something	  that	  
some	  Russians	  always	  seem	  to	  be	  seeking,	  without	  having	  to	  earn	  it.	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Tables	  and	  Figures	  
Table	  1	  –	  Merchandise	  Exports	  (Percent	  of	  GDP)	  
	   	   	   1870	   	   1913	   	   1973	   	   1998	  
UK	  	  	  	  	   	   	   12.2	   	   17.5	   	   14.0	   	   25.0	  
France	  	   	   	  	  4.9	   	   	  	  7.8	   	   15.2	   	   28.7	  
Germany	   	   	  	  9.5	   	   16.1	   	   23.8	   	   38.9	  
Spain	   	   	   	  	  3.8	   	   	  	  8.1	   	   	  	  5.0	   	   23.5	  
Russia	   	   	   	  	  	  na	   	   	  	  2.9	   	   	  	  3.8	   	   10.6	  
USA	   	   	   	  	  2.5	   	   	  	  3.7	   	   	  	  4.9	   	   10.1	  
India	   	   	   	  	  2.6	   	   	  	  4.6	   	   	  	  2.0	   	   	  	  2.4	  
China	   	   	   	  	  0.7	   	   	  	  1.7	   	   	  	  1.5	   	   	  	  4.9	  
Japan	   	   	   	  	  0.2	   	   	  	  2.4	   	   	  	  7.7	   	   13.4	  	  	  
World	   	   	   	  	  4.6	   	   	  	  7.9	   	   10.5	   	   17.2	  
	  




Table	  2	  –	  Foreign	  Assets	  (Percent	  of	  GDP)	  
	  
	   	   	   1914	   	   	   2005	  
UK	   	   	   92	   	   	   244	   	   	  
France	  	   	   67	   	   	   174	  
Germany	   	   26	   	   	   	  	  99	  
USA	   	   	   	  	  8	   	   	   	  	  90	  
Japan	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  neg.	   	   	   	  	  50	  
	  
	  
Sources:	  1914,	  calculated	  from	  Maddison	  (2001);	  2005,	  Cooper	  (2008).	  
	  
